This objective has been defined as FOOD SECURITY as opposed to self-sufficiency. 

This objective has been put forward by PCARRD, whose services has been contracted by DA for its on-going policy review in consultation with the PCCI Agricultural and Food Division composed of multi-sectoral members wherein the fertilizer industry sector is also represented. 

Adapting therefore for discussion purposes, FOOD SECURITY as the primary objective of government, the major components leading to this objective as defined by PCARRD are as follows: 
 

1. FOOD SUPPLY- referring mainly to rice, yellow/white corn and aquatic supply as well as factors affecting supply such as irrigation, variety constraints, seeds, inputs, and post production facilities.
2. AVAILABILITY- referring mainly to local production, imports or both.
3. ACCESSIBILITY- referring mainly to distribution and marketing and factors affecting its efficiency such as the rice/corn cartel and cost/mode of transportation.
4. AFFORDABILITY- refers mainly to market price to consumers.

With the factors affecting FOOD SECURITY, let us look at how the fertilizer industry has contributed as far as enhancing the 4 factors affecting FOOD SECURITY... 

Industry liberalization resulting to stiffer competition among manufacturers and importers resulting to lower ex-warehouse prices. 

        Constraints: 

Lower profitability for manufacturers and importers/distributors (not necessarily for dealers) due to insignificant growth in consumption resulting to less promotions, extension services, market development and activities and secrecy of market information. 
High cost of distribution due to transport (barging and trucking) and inefficient port handling facilities due to lack of equipment and monopolies of port contractors. 
Inaccessibility of lower ex-warehouse prices to farmer cooperatives who have to rely on the traditional chain of distribution (the middleman) for logistics and financing support. 
Unavailability of sufficient agricultural credit to individual farmers or cooperatives.

As a prelude to zero tariff come year 2001, government has reduced tariff from 5% to 3% for all fertilizer grades and raw materials whether imported or locally produced leading to a more balanced fertilization i.e. improved NP/NPK ratio to purely nitrogen grades. 

        Constraints: 

Significant drop in import prices of nitrogen grades, specifically urea and Ammosul vis-à-vis locally produced NP/NPKs which will only enhance bias of usage to nitrogen grades and cause further imbalance (not considering the significant drop also in NP/NPK s from South Korea and other neighboring countries). 
 

        Constraints: 

Product registration and EUP requirements of FPA should be further reviewed to encourage more odd grades vis-à-vis conventional or traditional grades. 
Urge FPA to graduate from a regulatory to a more developmental agency similar to IFDC in the USA. 
Government extension support for odd or customized grades. 
Updating of our soil maps.

          Constraints: 

Long delayed Philphos privatization has hindered investments due to fear of Philphos’ undue competitive advantage being a government owned corporation.

    Constraints: 

Malpractices in fertilizer trading i.e. under-weighing and adulteration

FPA’s lack of funds for continued monitoring i.e. check weighing, sampling at load port through SGS and at discharge ports through independent surveyors.

Funding assistance from the private sector 

Stiffer sanctions from FPA.

Continuous recipients of fertilizer grant monetized through the private sector i.e. KR2 funded by Japan through JICA, CIDA funded by the Canadian government, and PCA by ADB. 

        Constraints: 
 

Distortionary effect on commercial operations in terms of supply /demand, pricing and again, a bias towards nitrogen utilization, Ammosul and Urea being the main commodities traded. 

Availed of by cooperatives but monetized also through the private importer/distributors.